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Abstract 
 
Spain’s transport infrastructure policy has become a paradigmatic 
case of oversupply and of mismatch with demand. The massive 
expansion of the country’s transport infrastructure over the last 
decade has not been a response to demand bottlenecks or previously 
identified needs. For this reason, the intensity of use today on all 
interurban modes of transport in Spain falls well below that of other 
EU countries. This paper analyzes the institutional and regulatory 
factors that have permitted this policy, allowing us to draw lessons 
from the Spanish case that should help other countries avoid the 
pitfalls and shortcomings of Spanish policy. Based on our analysis, 
we also discuss policy remedies and suggest reforms in different 
regulatory areas, which could help improve the performance of 
Spain’s infrastructure policy. 
JEL classification: H54; L91; L98; R41; R42; R48 
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1. Introduction 
 
Spain’s infrastructure policy over the last decade has been characterized by an almost 
overwhelming degree of public investment that has, however, been largely unrelated to current or 
prospective demand. This situation has affected all interurban modes of transport. Indeed, the 
country’s policy managed to exacerbate the mismatch between supply and demand well before the 
economic crisis set in and provoked further reductions in demand. The reality of the situation is 
even acknowledged in the current Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI, 2012), in a section devoted 
to conducting a policy diagnosis [Part II, p. 57]: “Nonetheless, in recent years planning has focused 
on, and given priority to, the continued expansion of the system’s supply without any direct 
correlation existing with growth in demand”. Paradoxically, at around the same time, the Spanish 
Minister of Transportation and drafter of the Plan was recorded as saying in a speech in favor of 
maintaining government plans for extending the high-speed rail (HSR) nationwide: “I don’t want an 
asymmetric Spain (…) How do I explain to the Spaniards that the people of one region are more 
important than those of another”.1  
Even in the throes of the current economic crisis, the Spanish government continues to 
spend large amounts of resources on its HSR (c. 3,300 million euro in 2013, amounting to 33% of 
total central investment in transport infrastructure) and to build motorways on routes that carry little 
more than 1,000 vehicles per day. Under such a framework, the economic crisis can only worsen 
the mismatch between capacity and traffic with telling consequences for government budgets and 
future generations of tax payers. Indeed, the Assessment of the 2013 national reform programme 
and stability programme for Spain, issued by the European Commission on 29 May 2013, reports 
that: “More stringent cost-benefit analysis of proposed projects is needed to avoid further over-
investment and to optimize existing infrastructure. The 2013 NRP presents some conflicting goals 
for transport policy, e.g. reduction of the operation costs of the network and continued construction 
of high-speed railway lines.” (p. 33) 
  In this paper, in addition to presenting evidence of Spain’s overcapacity in all transport 
modes, we analyze the contribution made by institutional and regulatory policies to the existing and 
                                                 
1 Presentation of Spanish proposals for the Trans-European Transportation Network. Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid, 12 
February, 2012.  
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prospective oversupply and to the mismatch between traffic demand and (transport) capacity 
supply. This is examined both in network and single modes of transportation. By so doing, we 
provide further explanations for an overall design that has permitted the extreme imbalance in the 
present-day system. The Spanish experience, therefore, provides an example of the waste of public 
resources on overambitious programs of investment in underutilized infrastructure. Revealing the 
institutional and regulatory design that provided the mechanisms for such an irrational policy 
should, in itself, be a valuable lesson for any country seeking to modernize and improve its 
transport infrastructure.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a detailed description of the 
extent of the system’s current overcapacity and the mismatch between supply and demand by 
examining the statistics for each transport mode in an international benchmarking assessment. 
Second, we examine the rationale of the regulatory framework supporting the management and 
investment policies for high capacity networks (motorways and HSR) and single point-to-point 
infrastructure (airports and ports). Finally, we present our conclusions and discuss the policy 
implications that can be derived from the extreme case of mismatch between and traffic demand 
and capacity in Spain. 
 
2. Spain’s infrastructure policy: When supply travels far beyond demand 
 
Spain is – by a long way – the country whose infrastructure supply (including both interurban and 
long distance modes) has grown most in recent years. However, demand has not kept pace with the 
increase in supply – truth be told, this mismatch was evident even before the economic crisis set in 
at the end of the last decade. For this reason, the Spanish case has come to be seen as a paradigmatic 
case of the wasteful use of public resources for the building of infrastructure. This section presents 
data that allow a comparison to be made of the infrastructure supply in Spain with that available 
throughout the EU and other countries. The mismatch between infrastructure and demand is also 
described in greater detail. 
Beginning with surface networks, there can be little doubt that if anything has come to 
characterize Spain’s infrastructure policy since the early 2000s it has been the extension of the 
country’s high-speed rail based on the laying of new tracks and dedicated almost exclusively to 
passenger transport. Successive Spanish governments have presented their investment achievements 
at both domestic and international forums. The dedication of massive budgetary resources has 
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enabled Spain to build the most extensive (in absolute terms) HSR network in Europe and one that 
is even more extensive than the Chinese network in relative terms. Table 1 shows the extent of HSR 
(HSR  250 km/h) networks (in kilometers) in those countries that operate such a service (including 
the network that is operational and that which is under construction). 
 
According to information provided by the International Union of Railways (UIC) on 1 April 
2013, eight EU countries and fourteen countries worldwide offered a high-speed rail service. Of 
these, Spain was ranked second (to China) on the basis of the overall number of kilometers of 
network in operation, and ranked a clear first (50% more than its nearest rival France and 
considerably more than all the other countries) on the basis of the number of kilometers per million 
inhabitants. If to these figures we add the number of kilometers under construction, Spain further 
strengthens her leadership with a network that almost doubles France’s in terms of kilometers per 
million inhabitants.  
However, HSR ridership data tell quite a different story with figures for the EU as well as 
for the Asian countries being much higher than those recorded in Spain. For instance, annual 
ridership (number of trips) in Japan is well over 300 million, and over 110 million in France, 
whereas the number of trips on Spain’s HSR network in 2010 was just 16.8 million. A more refined 
view of the massive difference in ridership is obtained from data produced by the European 
Commission (2013b), which provides passenger*km -pkm- per country figures for 2011. From 
these, we can obtain the number of pkm for each kilometer of HSR network (that is, a true measure 
of a network’s intensity of use) in the EU countries. Table 2 compares the intensity of use of the 
HSR networks in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Ridership in France is 5 times higher than 
Spanish ridership relative to the network length. Relative ridership in Germany is 4.4 times that of 
Spain, and in Italy it 2.6 times that of Spain. Recall, moreover, that the length of the Spanish 
network more than doubles that of Italy and Germany. These differences are likely to have 
increased in recent years, because low density HSR lines have been opened in Spain, while the 
economic crisis has reduced demand across the whole network.  
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Tables 
  Table 1. High-Speed Rail ( HSR  250 km/h) in the World (November 1, 2013) 
Country Km HSR  
in operation 
Km HSR / Million 
people 
Km HSR operation 
+ construction 
Km HSR (op+cons) / 
Million people 
Spain 2431 52 3739 79 
France 2036 31 2793 43 
Belgium 209 19 209 19 
Japan 2087 16 2869 23 
Italy 923 16 923 16 
Taiwan 345 15 345 15 
Germany 1019 12 1447 18 
Austria 93 11 93 11 
South Korea 412 8 598 12 
Netherlands 120 7 120 7 
China 8359 6 14604 11 
Turkey 444 6 991 13 
Switzerland 35 4 107 13 
United Kingdom 113 2 113 2 
Source: HSR networks, from International Union of Railways (UIC). Population, from Eurostat and different national sources. Info downloaded on 
March 1, 2014  
 
Table 2. Intensity of use of the HSR network. Passenger-km per km of network. Selected countries 2011.  
Country Passenger-Km (million) HSR network 
(Km) 
Passenger-Km per Km of HSR network 
(Million passenger-Km/Km) 
France 52040 2036 25,6 
Germany 23310 1019 22,9 
Italy 12280 923 13,3 
Spain 11230 2144 5,2 
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer 
 
 
Spain is also the European Union country with the most extensive motorway network. At the 
end of 2011, it covered a distance of 14,554 km (a figure that does not include dual carriageways). 
In 2010, the last year for which Eurostat provides homogeneous data for almost all EU countries, 
Spain already had 14,021 km of motorway in service, followed by Germany with 12,819 km. In 
relative terms (i.e., km of motorways per million inhabitants), Spain, with more than 300 km per 
million inhabitants, was ranked well above all other large and medium-sized EU countries, as 
shown in Table 3. The population density of the motorway network in Spain is surpassed only by 
that of Slovenia and Cyprus, small countries with small populations and characteristics that are not 
really comparable. 
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Table 3. Motorways (free and tolled) in the European Union (2010) 
Country Km Motorways Km motorways / Million inhabitants 
Slovenia 771 377 
Cyprus 257 314 
Spain 14021 307 
Luxembourg 152 303 
Portugal 2737 259 
Sweden 1927 206 
Austria 1719 205 
Denmark 1130 204 
Ireland 900 198 
France 11392 176 
Belgium 1763 163 
Netherlands 2651 159 
Germany 12819 157 
Hungary 1477 147 
Finland 771 144 
Italy 6668 111 
Greece 1191 106 
Lithuania 309 98 
Estonia 115 86 
Slovakia 416 77 
Czech Republic 734 70 
United Kingdom 3673 59 
Bulgaria 437 59 
Poland 857 22 
Romania 332 16 
Latvia 0 0 
Malta 0 0 
Source: European Commission (2013b) EU transport in figures. Statistical Pocketbook, 2013. Brussels: European Commission.   
Eurostat for Latvia and  Malta, an also for population. 
 
 
 
Clearly, the fact of having a more extensive motorway network does not mean that the 
traffic volume will be equally great. In order to compare the intensity of use of motorway networks 
in Europe, we draw on the data provided by the International Transport Forum (OECD) for road 
passenger traffic in 2009. Table 4 shows these figures and calculates the ratio for the total number 
of passenger*km (pkm) over the length of the whole network. We find that the number of million 
passenger-km per km of motorway in Italy was 4.3 times higher than that in Spain; in Germany it 
was 2.6 times higher while in France the volume of traffic was 2.8 times greater. 
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Table 4. Intensity of use of Motorways (free and tolled). Selected countries, 2009. 
 
Country Passenger-km 
(Million) 
Length of Motorways Passenger-Km per 
Km of Motorway 
(Million passenger-
km/km) 
Italy 800 615 6661 120,2 
France 860 700 11 163 77,1 
Germany 949 975 12 813 74,1 
Spain 392 531 14 021 28,0 
Source: International Transport Forum (OEDC) for passenger-km. European Commission for length of Motorways. 
 
 
Unfortunately, there are no equivalent physical measures that allow us to make 
homogeneous cross-country comparisons of airport infrastructure supply. However, Fageda and 
Voltes (2012) have analyzed the average ratio of passenger numbers to the surface area of Spanish 
airport terminals and compared their results with a sample of international airports for 2010. They 
show that the mean number of passengers per square meter of terminal in Spain is 71, while the 
international mean is 101. Tellingly, sixteen Spanish airports have a mean number of passengers per 
square meter of terminal below 50. Table 5 shows the number of passengers per square meter of 
airport terminal in Spain.  
Data on airport investment obtained from the International Transport Forum (ITF) show 
that, between 2000 and 2009, investment in airports in Spain rose to 16,577 million euro. This 
figure is much higher than investment levels in other EU air markets with more than 100 million 
passengers:2 1.5 times that of Germany (although Germany has more traffic), 1.9 times that of 
France, and 4.8 times that of Italy. Equally, while 46 Spanish airports offer international 
commercial flights, 13 of them handled fewer than 100,000 passengers in 2012. Among these small 
airports, only that of La Gomera (Canary Islands) serves an island with low domestic and tourist 
demand. As such, this is the only airport that fulfils what might be considered a public service 
obligation to prevent isolation and provide mobility in an insular environment devoid of suitable 
alternatives. 3  
 
 
                                                 
2 ITF does not provide data on investment in the UK after 2005. 
3 Other airports located on islands are subject to public service obligations but these airports handle more than 100,000 
passengers per year.  
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Table 5. Passengers per square meter of terminal in Spanish airports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Fageda and Voltes-Dorta (2012). 
Data on investment in ports (also obtained from the ITF) show that, between 2000 and 2010, 
investment in Spain amounted to 21,988 million euro, which is almost double that invested in ports 
in Italy, more than three times that spent in Germany and six times that in France. By combining 
investment data with figures for maritime goods transport in tons (data provided by Eurostat), we 
Airport Passengers per square meter of terminal 
Albacete 5,13 
Logroño 6,13 
Córdoba 6,83 
Vitoria 7,24 
León 10,49 
La Gomera 10,68 
Salamanca 10,8 
Badajoz 13,9 
Burgos 14,44 
Pamplona 23,51 
Málaga 30,34 
Almería 31,6 
Zaragoza 37,29 
Barcelona 41,53 
Fuerteventura 44,88 
Santander 45,09 
Madrid 50,31 
Jerez 64,79 
Hierro 66,68 
Sevilla 68,14 
Tenerife Norte 75,53 
Bilbao 76,92 
Lanzarote 84,27 
La Coruña 84,31 
Tenerife Sur 86,17 
Gran Canaria 86,55 
Valladolid 87,26 
La Palma 93,09 
Palma de Mallorca 95,99 
San Sebastián 104,26 
Murcia 105,83 
Reus 109,9 
Granada 115,52 
Santiago 115,86 
Menorca 125,18 
Valencia 132,46 
Ibiza 138,1 
Vigo 139,99 
Melilla 159,29 
Girona 162,13 
Alicante 175,04 
Mean Spain 71,79 
Mean worldwide 
airports 
101,43 
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can build a measure for investment relative to port cargo traffic in most EU countries.4 For the 
period 2005 to 2010, the ratio (accumulated investment/port cargo traffic in tons) in Spain was 6.2 
euro per ton. This figure is well above that of all other countries in the EU as Table 6 illustrates: for 
instance, it is 3 times that of Italy and Germany, 3.7 times that of Portugal and 7 times that of 
France. 
Table 6. Accumulated investment in Ports per tons of goods (2005-2010). 
 
Country Accumulated Investment per tons of goods 
(Euro per ton) 
Spain 6,21 
Germany 2,18 
Italy 2,06 
Latvia 1,57 
Finland 1,49 
Slovenia 0,99 
France 0,89 
Estonia 0,85 
Lithuania 0,85 
Belgium 0,74 
Denmark 0,63 
Poland 0,32 
Sweden 0,27 
Greece 0,22 
United Kingdom 0,1 
Source: Eurostat for traffic of goods. International Transport Forum for investment figures. 
Note: Data on goods is not available for The Netherlands, Ireland and Romania. 
 
As can be seen, over-investment and the mismatch between supply and demand have been 
the most salient features of Spain’s infrastructure policy, affecting all interurban modes of transport. 
The over-investment of recent decades follows a long-term pattern in Spain’s infrastructure policy 
that is not driven by the requirements of mobility and economic activity, but rather by the desire to 
centralize transportation on the country’s political capital (Bel, 2011 and 2012; Albalate, Bel, and 
Fageda, 2012). This priority for connecting all provincial capitals to Madrid was established by the 
Second Law of Railways, introduced in 1870 (Bel, 2011). More recently, on 25 April 2000 (in the 
investiture debate preceding the 2000-2004 legislation), the Spanish government once again made it 
a priority to connect all provincial capitals to Madrid with its plan for the HSR network. Likewise, 
the development of the motorway network has usually responded to this same priority, especially 
when it has involved funding from the state budget (Bel, 2012). To achieve this objective, the 
geography of Spain and the coastal location of the country’s main metropolitan areas (with the 
                                                 
4 ITF does not provide data on investment in the Netherlands, and data of investment in the UK is not available after 
2005. 
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exception of Madrid) made the development of particularly long rail and road networks necessary, 
especially in comparison with the networks of Spain’s European neighbors. However, this over-
investment in transportation infrastructure, and especially spending on such facilities as airports and 
ports, cannot be explained solely in terms of centralization. We need to examine other motives, 
including the political influence wielded by the powerful construction sector – one of Spain’s 
leading economic sectors (Bel, Estache, and Foucart, 2014), whose may also account for over-
investment in other policy areas, such as the building of local facilities in a range of different fields.    
Given Spain’s low population density, the low concentration of population in the areas 
surrounding Madrid, and the distribution of economic activity throughout Spanish territory (see 
Figures 1 and 2), transport demand has been unable to sustain the development of this policy. As a 
result, state regulation and national budget subsidies have been regularly used to determine 
infrastructure priorities and to fund the development, maintenance, and operation of networks. 
To sum up, Spanish leadership in infrastructure supply is indisputable in all modes. Yet, 
demand has lagged far behind, especially in surface transportation networks. Below, we analyze the 
contribution that institutional and regulatory policies have made to this oversupply and the 
mismatch between demand and supply. 
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of population among Spanish regions 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics 
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Figure 2. Geographical distribution of gross domestic product among Spanish regions 
       
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics 
 
 
3. Institutional and regulatory causes of mismatch 
 
3.1 Network modes 
High capacity network modes have received – and, in fact, continue to receive – the largest share 
of Spanish investments in transport infrastructure. As a result, they also provide an obvious 
illustration of the mismatch that exists between infrastructure supply and demand. Taxpayer 
subsidies, together with the massive arrival of European funds for high-speed rail and free 
motorway projects, and the offer of favorable guarantees and the negotiation of risk mitigation 
agreements for private toll motorway projects, are among the main factors fueling this mismatch in 
network modes.  
Motorways 
Spain’s motorway network, which is under central government regulation, is characterized by a 
mixed funding model in which 75% of motorways are free, while the remaining 25% are tolled and 
privately operated. This duality can be accounted for by the different models that have been adopted 
in each of the three main waves of motorway investment in the country (Bel, 1999). Overall, Spain 
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boasts 16,358 km of motorways, the largest high capacity network in per capita terms in Europe if 
we consider countries of a comparable size.5 
The first motorways in Spain were opened to traffic under the dictatorship, which chose a 
privately toll motorway concession model to develop the network. Private motorway projects 
involve great uncertainties in terms of demand and cost risks, while private screening can be 
expected to provide profitable projects as it allows the selection of routes on the basis of predicted 
traffic volumes. However, the private advantage of being able to avoid white elephants is only 
possible with the right allocation of risk. In this regard, the dictatorship offered various guarantees 
and risk mitigating mechanisms including exchange rate insurance, an economic-financial 
breakeven guarantee and State-endorsed foreign debt (Bel, 1999).6 Under these regulations, the 
Motorway Plan projected a frenzied construction effort of 6,430 km of tolled motorways in just 
over a decade. However, the international economic crisis of the seventies was to highlight the 
important mismatch between projected capacity and actual traffic. Eventually, only 2,042 km of 
construction were awarded and by the 1980s only about 1,800 km were actually in operation. 
Moreover, part of the industry had to be rescued through a process of renegotiation and 
nationalization.  
In the late 90s and in the years that followed, the democratic central government continued 
to award new private toll motorway concessions and to offer similarly favorable guarantees. 
However, the most heavily used corridors were by now already covered by previous investments – 
both private and public. Consequently, most of the new motorways built (above all, those 
constructed to provide additional access routes to Madrid’s six existing motorways) are proven 
white elephants – with traffic volumes in some cases (the R2 concession, for example) at just 34% 
of expectations. The use of these motorways has been badly undermined by existing free parallel 
motorways, while their profitability has been hit by huge (unexpected) expropriation costs. Baeza 
and Vasallo (2012) report a significant bias towards the overestimation of traffic volumes on 
Spanish toll motorways. They argue that such overestimation is a strategic move given the 
possibilities for renegotiating concessions. Indeed, the State has been shown to have secured 
                                                 
5 This 2012 figure is obtained from the Ministry of Transport and includes free motorways, tolled motorways and free 
dual carriageways, which are technically similar but not the same as free motorways. Note that the figure is higher than 
that reported in Table 3 (section 2), as there we consider a technically homogeneous identification of motorways as 
provided by Eurostat.   
6 In spite of regulations favoring foreign investments, concessionaires were solely domestic. Interest in attracting capital 
from international financial markets was a strategy used to improve the Spanish balance of payments. Specifically, 
exchange rate insurance was provided to facilitate foreign private investment. 
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liabilities and is currently negotiating to rescue concessionaires that find themselves in trouble 
having accumulated debts of more than 3,500 million euro. 
The free motorway network is fully funded from the government budget and received its latest 
boost from large scale investment programs between 1984 and 1993. The switch from toll to free 
motorways was adopted in part because private initiative was unable to provide coverage in regions 
with low traffic volumes. Motorway plans in this period acquired a centralized design, connecting 
Madrid to provinces in the periphery. The impressive growth in levels of investment was possible in 
part to the massive arrival of European funds that targeted specific regions, but without any 
consideration of traffic volume. Unlike the toll motorways, this free network has been extended 
constantly since 1984.  
Since 1993, however, Spanish governments have not operated a strategic plan for the country’s 
motorways. Only selected projects have been presented in a number of investment programs, but no 
specific criterion has been applied as regards capacity enlargements. Technically, it is generally 
accepted that conventional roads should be converted into high capacity roads when they reach an 
average daily traffic of around 15,000 vehicles – or 10,000 when congestion is severe or heavy 
traffic represents a share of 15% or more. Yet, in Spain, current plans drawn up by the central 
government provide for the conversion into motorways of several roads with traffic volumes below 
2,000 vehicles per day – examples include the routes Cuenca-Teruel (1,399 daily vehicles), Huelva-
Zafra (1,409 daily vehicles) and Alcolea del Pilar-Caminreal (1,975 daily vehicles). There are at 
least five more such enlargement projects with daily traffic volumes below 4,000 vehicles (Macias 
and Aguilera, 2013).   
As for toll regulation, initial tolls are fixed at a rate that will guarantee the economic-financial 
breakeven of the private concessionaires. Regulatory price rules for toll motorways have evolved 
over time, but have always been established by law. The first concessions provided for toll updates 
calculated on the basis of complex polynomial equations that were dependent on the growth in 
inputs and materials required for construction; moreover, they were specific to each concession. 
The concessionaires though complained for years that such equations were only truly applicable in 
periods of construction, and eventually it was agreed to revise this rule. The central government 
opted for regular review so as to avoid involvement in constant automatic bilateral negotiations and 
to ensure updates that downgraded the system’s rigidity. Royal Decree 210/1990 substituted the 
earlier rule with an automatic update that was fixed at 95% of the rise in the consumer price index.  
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The latest stage in price regulation was initiated in 2001. The mechanism involves a price cap 
rule, which in turn is based on the difference between projected and actual traffic on each 
motorway. This price cap system represents an attempt to link price changes to the actual evolution 
in traffic so that extraordinary profits can be tied to reductions in real toll prices (Albalate, Bel, and 
Fageda, 2009).  
In spite of these changes, price regulation has played no significant role in the over-investment 
bias over time, especially if we consider that a large part of the Spanish network is free, which leads 
to well-known incentives to overinvest. Indeed, free motorways and fuel taxes are common 
occurrences worldwide and they have not necessarily led to oversupply. However, oversupply 
cannot be achieved without resorting to the budget. Even the concession contracts designed in Spain 
for the construction, operation, and maintenance of toll motorways have been characterized by a 
limited transfer of risk to private investors: first, as a result of guarantees awarded to ensure 
construction cost recovery;7 and, second, as a result of lax equity to debt ratio requirements. 
Consequently, concession contracts result in only a limited transfer of financial risks to the private 
sector, which impedes the construction of projects that might be sustained by economic activity and 
mobility alone. As such, both budget financing and private financing with subsidies and guarantees 
may result in oversupply, but not all countries with toll or free models inevitably produce 
oversupply. Ultimately, it is the objectives and the design of a country’s transport infrastructure 
policy that determine the financing instruments that are to be adopted.    
 Additional interpretations of the oversupply of free motorways include the satisfaction of short-
term goals, such as winning political elections (Castells and Solé, 2005), and long-term objectives, 
such as centralization (Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2012). The latter inevitably requires budget 
financing because of the low density corridors that connect the political capital with a number of the 
country’s peripheral cities. As a result, oversupply is dictated by policy design and the financial 
mechanism adopted is simply the instrument derived from that design.  
High-Speed Rail 
High-speed rail has been at the heart of Spain’s transport policy. Even in the 2013 budget – 
which included major cuts for education, health and social security – HSR was allocated 3,302 
                                                 
7 This is well illustrated by the recent discussion centered on nine toll motorway concessionaires that received 
concession awards over the last fifteen years and which faced financial trouble in 2013. Six were eventually declared 
bankrupt while the other three needed to be bailed out by the central government. Traffic forecasts were never met and 
to ensure construction cost recovery the State is obliged to pay around 4,000 million euro from the budget in 
compensation (see Albalate, 2014).   
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million euro, 71% of all investment for railways and 33% of the total investment provided by the 
Ministry of Fomento, responsible for almost all public investment activities (housing and postal 
services and not just transport infrastructure) in Spain. The Strategic Plan of Transport 
Infrastructure (PEIT, 2004) foresaw that 43.7% of total investment between 2005 and 2020 was to 
be dedicated to intercity rail, with a particular emphasis on high-speed rail, which was expected to 
receive a third of the Ministry’s total investments. The new Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI, 
2012), replacing the previous one, retains intercity rail investment at 39% of the total. It also 
confirms the general allocation of funding for high speed rail projects countrywide. The plan 
reflects the fact that since the year 2000, the main objective of Spain’s transport policy has been to 
provide an HSR link between the political capital and all provincial capitals – a policy shared by the 
two main political parties that have ruled the country over the last few decades. President José 
María Aznar was the first to establish this objective and he laid the foundations for a transport 
policy based on a huge investment effort and a design unconnected to existing capacity concerns or 
mobility patterns.8 This situation accounts for the fact that Spain continues to top the table in terms 
of new HSR construction (See Table 1 above), even when there is overwhelming evidence of the 
mismatch between supply and demand on the lines already in operation. Indeed, the market share of 
the rail mode in passenger-km stood at just 5.2% in 2011.9 
Such a mismatch cannot be supported by private initiative. Both the infrastructure and the 
service are managed by centralized publicly owned monopolies. There is a vertical accounting 
separation between the manager of the infrastructure (ADIF) and the manager of the service 
(RENFE) and both corporations are regulated by the Ministry of Transportation. 
Competition is not allowed among passenger traffic in Spain and the characteristics of the 
country’s infrastructure – distinct from those of conventional railways – are incompatible with 
freight transport. High-speed rail links have concentrated all of Spain’s modernization efforts in the 
passenger-related railway sector, with no interest for freight transport, which today suffers severe 
bottlenecks along the main corridors. As a result, Spain’s freight rail transport presents one of the 
lowest (and decreasing) market shares in Europe, standing at just 2.5%.10 As such this is the 
principal opportunity cost of investment efforts in passenger oriented high-speed rail, which should 
come as no surprise if we consider that ports and UIC-gauge railways have yet to be linked up in 
                                                 
8 This objective was first introduced by President José María Aznar on 25 April 2000 (Diario de sesiones del Congreso, 
2000, nº.2, [April 25] p.29). 
9 Estimates provided by the Ministry of Transport in the Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI) 2012-2024, part II, p.3. 
10 Estimates offered by the Ministry of Transport in the Transport Infrastructure Plan (PITVI) 2012-2024, part II, p. 5. 
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Spain. Indeed, the first project of this kind did not take place until 2012, when the Port of Barcelona 
was connected with a minor single dedicated track.  
The declared intent of connecting all provincial capitals to Madrid by HSR was not supported by 
any mobility patterns or transport needs. As a result, taxpayers, together with European funds 
(which account for around a quarter of project investments), have borne the brunt of the expense of 
the high-speed rail program (See Albalate and Bel, 2012).11 This has come about, first, because 
infrastructure investment has been fully subsidized, without any expectation of recovering costs via 
user fees.12 Moreover, infrastructure user fees do not fully cover the maintenance costs of the 
network and its railway stations. In fact, these fees are insufficient to recover even the variable costs 
of high-speed rail in many corridors. If we assumed a fee rate that made the recovery of variable 
costs possible, even for projects with a demand twice that of the Madrid-Barcelona line, subsidies 
would be required for up to half the marginal cost value (Albalate and Bel, 2012, p. 104). As a 
result, the infrastructure has to be fully subsidized, as does the rolling stock in part (even though it 
was purchased by RENFE). Second, it reflects the fact that, during the early years of operation, 
prices were heavily subsidized. In this regard, the European Commission prohibited subsidies to 
cover operating losses on RENFE’s long distance services, including its high-speed rail lines, in 
2009. This aid had amounted to € 248 million in 2007, and would have risen to € 400 million in 
later years. None of the high speed lines fulfills public service obligations. All in all, Spain’s HSR 
lines, obtained at great expense, have been built for passenger volumes that fall well short of targets 
that would justify their existence, as various cost benefit analyses of HSR investments have shown 
(De Rus and Inglada, 1993; De Rus and Roman, 2006). Yet, despite the financial burdens suffered, 
Spain enjoys the longest HSR network and continues to make a huge fiscal effort to further its 
expansion. 
 
3.2 Single facilities 
 
In Spain, single transport facilities are characterized by a centralized management model of publicly 
owned monopolies – AENA aeropuertos for airports and Puertos del Estado for ports – under 
central government control. Although ports and airports are two types of infrastructure that have a 
                                                 
11 It is worth recalling that because of Spain’s relief and urban density, the average construction costs of the HSR 
network have been lower than those in other European countries, and well below those in Italy (See Beria and Grimaldi, 
2011). 
12 Note that in France – a country with a very similar network in terms of length – the recovery of infrastructure 
investments on none of its lines is 0%, whereas in Spain no line has an infrastructure investment recovery higher than 
0%.  
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local economic influence within their respective hinterlands and which are funded by user payments 
(as a system), the main management decisions are taken by centralized institutions that implement 
cross-subsidy schemes between business units and price regulations that do not reflect their 
individual costs. These two mechanisms provide a regulatory framework that facilitates 
overcapacity (due to a scale of investment that would not be possible if it depended solely on their 
individual revenues) leading to a sizeable mismatch between infrastructure supply and demand 
(which, furthermore, is not justified by public service obligations).   
Airports
AENA manages 47 of the 48 airports with commercial traffic in Spain.13 This contrasts with the 
present situation in other European countries with various large airports, such as France, United 
Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, where airports are managed on an individual basis by either public 
or private firms (for more details on airport management practices in Europe, see Bel and Fageda, 
2010).14   
AENA is the owner of all the facilities provided by Spain’s airports and it controls all the 
financial resources generated by them. All investment plans are drawn up jointly between AENA 
and the Ministry of Transport, with airport charges being fixed by the Spanish Parliament. All other 
relevant decisions regarding airport management are made by AENA, including those related to the 
undertaking of retail activities, the allocation of slots, check-in counters and airline gates.   
The centralized management system means that Spanish airports are unable to compete with 
each other to attract airline services, as typically occurs in other European countries. Furthermore, 
any financial losses are compensated through a cross-subsidy system. Here, Bel and Fageda (2009) 
show that the cross-subsidy system is not necessarily driven by a criterion of solidarity as it is 
usually claimed. On the contrary, a significant positive correlation can be found between 
investments and GDP per capita, leading to a larger allocation of the resources raised by profitable 
airports to the richest territories. 
As regards revenues, Law 25/1998 fixed the initial values for current aeronautical charges (the 
fees for landing and aircraft parking, and for terminal use, etc.) and other fees, including car parking 
                                                 
13 The only commercial airport not managed by AENA is Lleida-Alguaire, a small airport that handled just 33,041 
passengers in 2012. A further three airports, which do not currently carry commercial traffic, are not managed by 
AENA.  
14 Exceptions do exist; thus airports located in the same urban area tend to be managed by one single firm. This is the 
case of airports in Paris, Rome and Milan and it was the case of those in London and Glasgow before the break-up of 
BAA airports.  
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and the retail activities undertaken by AENA. The company operates four airport categories and 
sets aeronautical charges accordingly (note that within the same category, price differences are 
minimal). The airports of Madrid and Barcelona are in the first category, the main tourist airports 
comprise the second, while the other two categories are made up of the airports handling lower 
traffic volumes. This discrete categorization of regulation, however, fails to allow prices to reflect 
individual costs, and as such is a significant source of inefficiency. 
Any changes to these charges proposed by AENA must receive the approval of the Spanish 
Parliament. Thus, in theory, airport charges are based on the total costs of all the airports managed 
by AENA; however, in practice, these charges are approved by Parliament, so they are adjusted 
annually in line with the charges made for other public services (except in 2011 and 2012 when 
airport charges in Madrid and Barcelona were increased substantially in relation to those in place at 
the other airports because of the huge investment debts accumulated in Barcelona and, above all, in 
Madrid). Thus, while charges are strictly regulated, they do not necessarily cover costs.    
It should be noted, therefore, that AENA has recorded financial losses since 2007, making it the 
airport operator reporting the largest deficit in the world (Bel and Fageda, 2011). AENA’s current 
debt stands at more than 14,000 thousand million euros. In 2011, only ten airports were profitable 
and each of them moves more than four million passengers per year. This contrasts starkly with 
reports for other European airports where the traffic profitability threshold can be as low as one 
million passengers (European Commission, 2002). 
In short, the poor financial performance of Spanish airports can be attributed to a lack of 
competition, the cross-subsidy system and the absence of incentives to be cost efficient. All these 
factors, derived from the centralized management system, have a detrimental impact on the 
financial accounts of Spanish airports and encourage the tendency to over-invest, which is perhaps 
the main factor accounting for AENA’s current financial distress.  
Ports
Public ownership and centralized decision-making on such matters as investment and prices also 
characterize Spain’s ports. However, the Port Authorities have a greater degree of financial 
autonomy than that enjoyed by the airports since here investments are more closely linked to the 
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amount of revenues that each port generates individually. Furthermore, privately-owned terminals, 
with high degrees of independence from the Port Authorities, are permitted on port premises.15  
The two main agencies managing the ports of Spain are Puertos del Estado and the Port 
Authorities. Puertos del Estado is a state-owned company whose main objectives are to coordinate 
operations and to approve the Port Authorities’ investment plans. The company is financed by four 
per cent of the total revenues of each Port Authority located on the mainland and two per cent of the 
revenues of ports situated on islands, and in Ceuta and Melilla.   
Spain has 28 Port Authorities managing a total of 47 ports.16 The Port Authorities are public 
institutions that have their own legal structure and a president appointed by the regional 
Government. The president’s role is to propose investment plans and establish concession contracts 
with the companies that operate in the terminal. All the Port Authorities are financed by property 
income and port charges that are paid by terminal operators and shipping firms. The initial values of 
port charges are fixed by law and the annual update is approved in provisions accompanying the 
General Budget Law. No formal link has been established between charges and costs, although the 
Port Authorities are generally profitable.  
The regulations provide some scope for price competition through the use of two tools: a 
correction coefficient and discounts. The correction coefficient is the percentage that each Port 
Authority can apply in order to modify the fee paid by the shipping companies. The main feature of 
the correction coefficient is that it involves a “regulation of maximum profits”. Thus, a Port 
Authority with profit levels higher than the national mean has to lower its prices, while a Port 
Authority with lower profit levels has to increase its prices. Such a regulatory measure however can 
cause an economic distortion, as the price setting is not necessarily related to the costs of each Port 
Authority. The second tool to promote competition comprises the discounts that Port Authorities 
can apply under certain conditions (regulated by law) to terminal operators and shipping companies. 
For each Port Authority, the regulation fixes an upper limit, this being the maximum amount that 
discounts can represent as a share of the port’s total revenue.  
Ports in Spain can also receive resources from the “Inter-port Compensation Fund”, which sees 
resources being transferred between ports to compensate for disadvantageous situations arising 
from hinterland limitations or island locations, and to improve the ports’ road and rail accessibility. 
                                                 
15 There have been several changes in the legislation regulating port management in Spain since the early nineties (see 
Castillo-Manzano et al., 2008, for details) 
16 Other minor non-commercial ports are subject to regional regulation.  
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To finance this fund, each Port Authority has to contribute up to 12 per cent of their income, with 
the actual share being determined by its financial status. However, in the case of the Port 
Authorities of the Canary and Balearic Islands, and of Ceuta and Melilla, the percentage falls 50 per 
cent. 
However, Fageda and González-Aregall (2014) show that the current regulation of port charges 
does little to foster price competition, while Castillo-Manzano and Fageda (forthcoming) report a 
tendency towards over-investment in the Spanish port system. Since the early nineties, investment 
in the Spanish port system has multiplied three-fold (after controlling for inflation). Port Authorities 
have been accruing debt with financial institutions at a double-digit annual growth rate, so that the 
accumulated debt more than doubles the total annual revenue for the whole port system. In a similar 
vein, Hidalgo-Gallego and Núñez-Sánchez (2013) show, by estimating a cost-function for the 1986-
2005 period, that most Spanish ports are operating at over-capacity. Hence, the combination of 
weak price competition and the financial autonomy of the Port Authorities seem to have led to 
capacity competition and the resulting overcapacity of the Spanish port system.  
3.3. The role of management, financing and price regulation across modes 
Above and beyond the specific features of the models of management, financing and price 
regulation for each mode of transportation, there are certain common characteristics shared across 
the modes that allow us to provide a brief, more horizontal review of Spain’s transport 
infrastructure policy and its associations with the existing mismatch between demand and supply. 
Table 7 summarizes some of these shared features.   
Table 7. Regulatory approaches of transport infrastructures in Spain 
 Management Price regulation 
  Scheme Surcharge/Discounts 
Motorways Private concessions 
subject to tolls 
Price-cap Changes based on real and 
projected traffics 
 Public management 
and financing 
No applicable No applicable 
High-speed rails Centralized by a 
public firms 
Charges set annually 
by law 
NO 
Airports Centralized by a 
public firm 
Charges set annually 
by law
NO 
Ports Centralized by a 
public firm 
Charges set annually 
by law 
Discounts based on profits of 
port authorities and traffic of 
shipping companies/terminal 
operators 
Source: Authors’ 
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The origin of oversupply in Spain can be traced primarily to political meta-objectives unrelated 
to transportation and mobility demands. We refer above all to territorial and administrative 
objectives of centralization attainable through the development of transport infrastructure (see Bel, 
2011, for an explanation of the historical pattern which saw centralization being made a priority, 
and the empirical study conducted by Albalate, Bel, and Fageda, 2013, of the objectives pursued by 
infrastructure investments in Spain). In addition, the provision of infrastructure in Spain has been 
understood as an egalitarian policy that measures inequality according to the level of infrastructure 
available to the country’s citizens in terms of its stock and quality of service.17  
Given a design based on oversupply, all models of management, financing and price regulation 
must necessarily adhere to this primary function of the infrastructure policy. As a result, this policy 
and the provision of transport services will typically be delivered by a centralized public entity: the 
Ministry itself, in the case of motorways, or specially created public corporations under Ministry 
ownership, in the case of ports, airports and railways. This explains why Spain is an exception – to 
comparable European countries – in its joint centralized management of all ports and airports by 
public corporations. This system permits the transfer of resources from profitable to unprofitable 
infrastructure and services, which is essential in a transport policy driven by investments that bear 
no relation to market mechanisms. It also produces highly regulated prices that diverge from the 
optimal amounts required to sustain national infrastructure networks and any expansions of them. In 
this regard, Spain is unique among comparable European countries in that it regulates the prices of 
all transport infrastructure services via laws enacted by its central Parliament. 
Furthermore, the financing model is also conditioned by the mismatch between supply and 
demand because economic activity and mobility are insufficient to sustain the level of infrastructure 
and the quality of transport services. For this reason, budget financing of the infrastructure network 
is common in Spain (as we have shown in the subsections devoted to motorways and high-speed 
rail), to levels that hardly bear comparison with the financing of other European countries. 
However, this is not the case of single facilities, financed by user payments. Yet, excess investment 
has contributed to the current level of debt suffered by the public corporations. As we have seen, in 
                                                 
17 It has been the common claim of successive Transportation Ministers that egalitarian access to such infrastructure as 
HSR “makes Spaniards equal”. See, for instance, a public statement by the current Minister of Transportation in 
http://www.rtve.es/alacarta/videos/informe-semanal/informesemanal-21-04-12/1382803/ (go to 1h03’40; downloaded 1 
March 2014). 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública Document de Treball 2014/09, pàg. 24 
Research Institute of Applied Economics Working Paper 2014/09, pag. 24 
 
 
24 
 
2012 the corporation responsible for the management of Spain’s airports had run up debts of 12,750 
million euro. 
All in all, a centralized public management system, based on budget financing, strict price 
regulation and cross-subsidy mechanisms, makes it easier to satisfy the meta-objectives that have 
led to the enormous oversupply of infrastructure in Spain today. 
4. Discussion and Policy Implications 
We have shown that Spain’s transport policy in recent years has been characterized by a sizeable 
mismatch between capacity investment and traffic demand. In this instance, the mismatch cannot be 
attributed to problems of isolation or accessibility, but rather to programs of public investment and 
regulatory and institutional mechanisms that have actively favored overcapacity, together with a 
consistent and long-term pattern of centralization based on satisfying political and administrative 
rationales, rather than meeting the requirements of mobility and economic activity.  
The management of Spain’s railways, airports and ports is the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Transportation and it fulfills these tasks on a centralized basis. In the case of motorways a mixed 
model of management and financing is operated. As such, some motorways are managed by private 
firms through a concession and financed by the tolls paid by users. All other motorways are 
managed by the Ministry of Transportation and are financed exclusively from the public budget. 
High-speed rail is financed by the public budget (investment) and partially by user payments 
(operation), while airports and ports are financed through user charges and cross-subsidies.   
As for the regulation of user charges, a price-cap is in place for private motorway 
concessionaires and pricing decisions are linked to specific parameters related to the difference 
between real and estimated traffic. In the case of the other modes of transport, charges are set 
annually by law but the criteria used for fixing these prices are not made explicit. However, some 
similarities exist between motorways and ports, since the Port Authorities can apply discounts under 
certain conditions regulated by law. 
Overall, a centralized system of public management and the fixing of charges in a manner 
not necessarily related to costs are two significant characteristics of Spain’s transport infrastructure 
policies. Within this context, investments do not often correlate with levels of current or expected 
demand, but rather seek to satisfy meta-objectives of centralization and equality in terms of the 
availability and quality of infrastructure. These investments, and the present absence of any 
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economic recovery, impose a large burden on Spain’s economic policy via the annual charges on 
the financing of infrastructure as well as in terms of government indebtedness. Furthermore, current 
policy imposes another large burden on the Spanish economy, given that fiscal efforts are not 
devoted to the promotion of productivity gains or the relief of capacity constraints and, as such, 
have no link with the needs of an efficient economy in times of need.   
Of further concern is the fact that no major reform is foreseen in either current or 
prospective policies for limiting this overcapacity. Indeed, the current economic crisis and the fiscal 
constraints being imposed by the European institutions do nothing to prevent the extension of large 
expensive transport projects that continue to be justified under the same policies as those adopted in 
the recent past. 
As has been argued, today’s network modes are the outcome of large investment programs, 
funded primarily from the public budget, and which have failed to take into consideration future 
traffic forecasts. Even in the case of private toll motorways, the institutional and regulatory design 
of concession contracts (and their offer of generalized guarantees) has mitigated the importance of 
demand risk in the valuation of projects, resulting in similar white elephant projects to those 
produced by the Government in its free motorway programs. In the case of single facilities, the 
main problems driving overcapacity can be identified as (1) institutional – due to the centralization 
of management under publicly owned corporations controlled by the central government; and, (2) 
regulatory – due to the use of price regulations based on cross-subsidy schemes not justified by 
public service obligations.  
Reforming transport policy in Spain is urgent; yet, recent developments appear to show that 
current policies are limitless, even though they are having a negative impact on both current and 
future generations. What is required are measures that seek to link investment and capacity to 
different service delivery thresholds. This means accommodating investment projects and the 
modernization of each mode – gradually, when indivisibilities do not apply – to the demand 
expectations of non-commercial infrastructure. In the case of commercial infrastructure it is 
imperative that the institutional and regulatory framework be reformed. In this regard, the 
management of these units should be undertaken on an individual basis and price regulations need 
to be reformed so as to ensure that fees charged meet costs. However, this will only be possible if 
the reforms provide a (new) regulation of the public policy process. 
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Spain is the only example among the large and medium-sized countries of the OECD in 
which absolutely all interurban transportation modes are under central government control. 
Regulation and institutional designs are all determined by the Ministry of Transportation (either 
directly by the Ministry or indirectly by corporate companies owned by the Ministry) and, as 
shown, they have promoted over-investment. Internationally no executive enjoys a comparable 
concentration of powers in the transport sector. Thus, institutional reforms need to consider the 
establishment of an independent regulatory agency for transport (whether this should be modal-
specific or cover all modes would be an issue for further research) and one that is outside central 
government control. This is of pressing interest; especially, if we bear in mind that the Ministry of 
Transportation itself is aware of the lack of correlation between investment and growth in demand; 
yet, the political precepts consider an equal endowment of infrastructures (in terms of both quantity 
and quality) to guarantee equality between the citizens of different regions.  
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